Dr. Begench Karaev
“…Turkmenistan plays a very important role in international relations, in particular, in interaction with the United Nations. In these turbulent times, I highly appreciate Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality” – From a statement by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to journalists in Ashgabat (July 6, 2024)
The words of the UN Secretary General about the “turbulent times” in the current era, uttered within the framework of the etiquette of high diplomacy, have a very deep and serious meaning, hinting at the entire complexity of what is essentially a stalemate in world politics. If we refer to chess vocabulary, then in the global game of modern times, the defending checkmate is, as it were, fully protected, and the attacking side will most likely have to agree to a draw. Even hypothetically, the least ranked and therefore traditionally sacrificial figure, for which one move was not enough to turn into a queen, but stepped into a stalemate, may remain beyond condemnation. As is known, the promotion of a pawn is one of the rules of the game of chess, according to which an ordinary infantryman who has reached the last horizontal of the battlefield becomes any figure (except the king) at the choice of the player making the move. This privilege is granted only to the pawn and no other figure. At the same time, the newly-minted queen, that is, the former private, is not the result of a self-sacrificing path of “self-made man”, but the strategic success of the player moving the pieces.
It is hard to believe that the ancient Eastern rulers would have allowed, even in chess rules, a simple warrior to rise to the level of their vizier. But the original rules of “chatranj” – chess, hint that brave individuals achieved such an honor only by defeating an opponent. In particular, having experienced slavery in his youth, the legendary Nadir Shah became the “Napoleon of the East” and created a huge empire that rivaled the Ottomans and Russia. Napoleon himself, born more than twenty years after Nadir’s death, was called “little corporal” at the beginning of his service. Even as an emperor, Napoleon was perceived by European monarchs as nothing more than a Corsican upstart punisher, and one without “blue bloods.”
On the fields of Brzezinski’s “chessboard”, according to Talleyrand’s principle of legitimacy, the “guilty” soldier, despite all the negatives, even in the case of the “capitulation of the king”, retains his rank, as, incidentally, do all the other figures. That is, he continues to remain mainly an exchange item for most cases of “bargaining” in the “game of kings”.
A stalemate in chess is not a voluntary but a forced draw, and the side that stopped one step away from victory may demand revenge, which in the realities of the geopolitical arena means a call for a new war. This is clearly unacceptable. Therefore, following the logic of Guterres’s above-mentioned reasoning, we can conclude that the key institutions have a very important mission to prevent a critical escalation of tension in the world, where neutrality may not be the last place.
President of Turkmenistan Serdar Berdimuhamedov specifically described the global situation and strategic vision of the tasks of regional cooperation. In particular, the head of Turkmenistan emphasized that: “At the current stage, against the backdrop of the complexities of the global situation, the main and unconditional priority for the Central Asian states should remain the preservation of peace, harmony and stability. We are united in making our region prosperous, highly developed and deeply integrated into modern global relations, while maintaining its identity, independence and the right to choose an internal and external development model. I am convinced that only under such conditions will our states and peoples be able to ensure a decent and confident future for themselves.”
“We cannot allow attempts to involve our region in some spheres of influence, especially in conflicts, to be carried out, to give grounds to doubt the independence and subjectivity of Central Asia as a geopolitical, economic, cultural and civilizational space with a thousand-year history,” said President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, “Our peoples have their own agenda: peace, good neighborliness, brotherhood and cooperation.”
This conceptual vision also reflects the comprehensive applicability of the principles of neutrality – already on a regional scale, when a vast and stable zone is formed at the junction of East and West. The space of neutrality, being not involved in systemic confrontations and free from conflicts, is designed to be protected from the geopolitical consequences of the global confrontation, as hinted at by the UN Secretary General in Ashgabat a month before the Central Asian summit in Astana. Using the philosophical interpretation of Einstein’s theory of relativity in a geopolitical sense it can be asserted that such a space is not subject to curvature under the gravitational influence of global centers of power.
The importance of the instruments of the Turkmen model of neutrality, unlike others, is due to their focus on close integration with the mechanisms of the Community of Nations, primarily in combination with the methods of peaceful dialogue and preventive diplomacy. Here, it is worth paying attention to the speech of the President of Turkmenistan from the rostrum of the second high-level meeting in the Central Asia-Germany format, which took place on September 17, 2024 in Astana. In particular, the Head of Turkmenistan stated that “Among the most important tasks of our joint work, Turkmenistan especially highlights the achievement and maintenance of regional peace, security and stability. We believe that in the current conditions, closer political and diplomatic interaction between the countries of Central Asia and Germany can have a noticeable constructive impact on the overall situation in the region and in adjacent areas. It is necessary to involve the efforts of the world community in this, primarily represented by the United Nations, based on the common intentions of the leadership of our countries to see Central Asia as a peaceful, calm, economically attractive region, a space of stability and predictability.”
As 2025 , the International Year of Peace and Trust, approaches, and against the backdrop of the start of the next session of the UN General Assembly, it is becoming increasingly clear that neutrality is now reaching beyond the borders of one country. This is evidenced by major decisions, including the adoption of a number of special UN General Assembly resolutions in support of Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality, the declaration of December 12 as the International Day of Neutrality, the formation of the Group of Friends of Neutrality at the UN and the growing interest in its activities. It is possible that, in essence, the phenomenon of neutrality is already becoming a systemic and functional part of world politics, where Turkmenistan’s ideas and initiatives are receiving increasing support.
It must be acknowledged that sometimes there is a simplified interpretation of the essence of neutrality, when even highly educated scientists consider this status as corresponding to the interests of a single entity, and possibly several others who have a certain benefit from it. But, it is necessary to analyze the phenomenon of neutrality, even of a single country, in a broader context through the prism of prospects for easing tensions in large geopolitical spaces and preventing systemic confrontation on a global scale.
For a more detailed analysis of the stabilizing effect of neutrality for applied purposes, let us recall that the outstanding scientist, Nobel Prize winner, Belgian of Russian origin Ilya Prigogine once drew attention to the isometric identity of processes in nature and society, and also drew attention to the logical interconnectedness and interdependence of chaos and order. From this assumption follows the possibility of using the methods of natural and exact sciences in the study of social phenomena. In this context, Prigogine analyzed the phenomenon of irreversibility in connection with the possibility of applying the principles of thermodynamics and entropy in the study of complex processes in the socio-political evolution of mankind. Without going into the complexity of this concept, we note that the system of international relations in its holistic consideration is a closed system, and only its individual structural components can be open to other parts of this system.
In this case, the “heat exchange” between the “cold” and “hot” parts of world politics should find its balance at the top of such a political and diplomatic Olympus, which can be considered the UN. In the same way, in the regions of the formation of “hot spots” of the international system, there should be such “spaces” that facilitate “local cooling”. In this case, it would be possible to extinguish growing conflicts at their initial stage. To a certain extent, this is the essence of the preventive function of a neutral space, where the shoots of trust between geopolitical actors can form.
Here it is necessary to understand much more broadly and deeply the content of the concept of “neutrality” in the historical context, when this foreign policy strategy was mostly expressed in the real actions of the state and its leaders, rather than recorded in documents. In addition, neutrality does not mean some kind of isolation, as some publicists try to portray, but most of all pragmatism in the name of maintaining peace in international relations in its broadest sense. In this context, it is known that large states that subsequently achieved imperial power, in certain periods of their history implemented a foreign policy doctrine that de facto included the principles and methods of neutrality.
Speaking about the significance of the factor of neutrality in the context of the history of international relations, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that its principles, as a rule, begin to be actualized in periods of the highest aggravation of the level of confrontation between systemically conflicting parties. And there have been many such periods – starting with the “Cold War” of the 20th century and going back centuries to ancient times. From among those states that preferred neutrality instead of involvement in war, large subjects of international relations subsequently emerged – politically powerful and economically rich, capable of dictating their will to previously dominant actors.
As an example, we can cite the history of US foreign policy in the 19th and 20th centuries, which initially fenced itself off from intra-European civil strife with the Monroe Doctrine, and then took an active part in the formation of the Versailles and Potsdam systems of international relations. The same Switzerland, which had maintained its neutrality for several centuries, turned into a world center of finance and banking. One of the decisive circumstances in the formation of the Great Seljuks and the subsequent emergence of the Ottoman Empire was also, to a certain extent, their policy of non-interference in the contradictions between Western Rome and Byzantium.
Speaking about the forms and methods of implementing neutrality, it is necessary to stipulate that, nevertheless, contrary to the teaching of Thomas Hobbes about the “war of all against all” (Bellum omnium contra omnes), the history of international relations for the most part does not abound in such a chaotic state. Yes, there were wars, but they were fought between major competitors for leadership and subsequent dominance in certain, albeit vast, territories. In this regard, the modern world differs little from its picture in the periods of antiquity or the Middle Ages.
Humanity has progressed to a greater extent due to the creative work of geniuses, philosophers and scientists, achievements in culture, science and education, due to information, industrial and technological innovations of the corresponding eras. In this series, in the late Middle Ages, the West overtook the East primarily due to borrowing the civilizational achievements of the Islamic world, rather than using the fruits of its wars and conquests. The great geographical discoveries of the Europeans were also initially largely motivated by the desire to “discover India” in order to get rich by supplying goods to their own countries, rather than conquering new lands. After all, the barbarians did not destroy Rome, guided by a targeted strategy, but actually fell into the internal ruins of a decrepit empire, which by that time had already disintegrated into two parts. Many centuries before this, the Gauls and Celts, experiencing the power of the weapons of the generals Caesar and Vespasian, respectively, generally speaking, did not interfere in the then wars of Rome with its southern and eastern neighbors.
History shows that most often the conquerors are not so much the symbolically rich and well-fed, but the poor and hungry, and this is obvious in the example of ancient barbarians or nomads. Although, the same barbarian or nomad would hardly consider himself poor or hungry, if we recall the proud warriors of the Huns, Oghuz, Gauls, Mongols, etc. Therefore, the best and most effective defense for the “well-fed” who were surrounded by the “hungry” was the tactic of “throwing a bone” into the crowd of the latter, Tzu claimed in his book The Art of War.
Renunciation of war, as one of the results of neutrality, can bring much more benefits than the use of armed violence. In this regard, the tactics of neutrality occupied one of the key techniques in the military-political and diplomatic arsenal of strong leaders. In most cases, neutrality was the result not so much of a voluntary expression of will, as a forced measure – in response to military action, or a multilateral compromise of the conflicting parties.
Strategically, the neutrality of a strong state contributed significantly to preventing a “clash of worlds,” and this was sometimes called “armed neutrality.” A clear example of this can be the famous Declaration of Armed Neutrality of Empress Catherine II, as well as the proclamation of the well-known Monroe Doctrine, when the United States cooled the dust of the European Holy Alliance. Then the victors over Napoleon “set their sights” on the territories of South America and the former possessions of France in North America. This doctrine, never removed from the table, simultaneously became a platform for the subsequent formalization of US neutrality – an effective foreign policy strategy over a long historical period.
Going deep into history, let us recall the “great homeland” of the legendary Mycenaean king Agamemnon – ancient Argolis, which competed with the mighty Sparta for leadership in the Peloponnese. Argolis maintained neutrality during the Greco-Persian wars of 500-449 BC, although this seemed to be the most appropriate case to deal with a formidable competitor in the common Hellenic world. Argolis’ neutrality was justified by the desire, on the one hand, to preserve the integrity of the Greek community, and on the other , to prevent a clash of two civilizations: the West, represented by the Greeks, and the East, represented by the Persians. Nevertheless, based on the realities of that time, the capital of Argolis – Argos, subsequently became one of the centers of the Achaean unification for protection from aggressors, as a result of which in In 229 BC, the powerful Achaean League was revived . The Achaeans resisted and stubbornly resisted the Romans for almost a century until they were forced to join the Roman Empire.
Orazklychev, a senior researcher at the Institute of History and Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences of Turkmenistan, put forward a hypothesis that Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality originated from the ancient state of Parthia. According to him, the Parthian Kingdom signed an agreement with the Roman Empire back in 69 BC and legitimized its status of neutrality.
Orazklychev’s assumptions are based on the texts of ancient chronicles by such authors as Plutarch, Gaius Sallustius Crillus and a number of others. Challenging his conclusions about Parthia’s neutrality, a researcher from the University of Glasgow, Luca Anceschi, points out the lack of documents confirming the agreement between Parthia and Rome. But, unfortunately, neither Parthia nor Rome left their descendants their archives of official documents, and here ancient chronicles are the main source for studying the ancient world, especially the East of the period of antiquity.
The essence of the neutrality of that time was Parthia’s unwillingness to get involved in the conflict between Rome and Pontus, avoiding being drawn into the “internal” contradictions of the West. Nevertheless, the Romans, who had concluded an agreement with the Parthians in 69 BC on the latter’s neutrality, violated their own obligations about fifteen years later and attacked Parthia. The battle took place in June 53 BC and ended with the death of the Roman commander Crassus and his army in the Battle of Carrhae. As Orazklychev notes , this “served as a good lesson not only for the Romans, but for everyone: neutral does not mean weak. Since then, the world could not help but reckon with the crushing military power of the Parthians. And 16 centuries later, the pen of William Shakespeare paid tribute to Parthia by depicting “the invincible Parthian horsemen” on the pages of the play “Antony and Cleopatra”.
One should agree with the statement of the Turkmen scholar that “Parthia’s neutrality was a form of non-participation in military coalitions, but not self-removal from international political, economic and cultural life. In politics, Parthia continued to receive ambassadors and send its own, including to Rome. It arranged dynastic marriages to strengthen good relations with its geopolitical partners. In the trade sphere, Parthia not only continued to develop its intercontinental project of the Great Silk Road, but also took an unprecedented step: in the western provinces of the state, where the majority of the population were either Greeks or spoke Greek, Parthian silver drachmas were minted in Greek. This was done specifically to facilitate trade operations on the western borders of the empire.”
There are many examples of the application of neutrality methods from the subsequent history of international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy of the East. In particular, a certain interest may be aroused by the decrease in the intensity of military activity and aggressive ambitions of the Khazar state in exchange for the growth of its foreign economic activity in the last periods of its existence, when key positions among the military elite were occupied by representatives of the Oghuz Turks.
Initially mercenary troops in the Khazar state, the Turkic ancestors of the future Seljuks, following the example of Dukak and Seljuk, rose to the level of military and political nobility. The famous orientalist V. Bartold in his monograph on the history and philology of the Turkic and Mongolian peoples points out that the Seljuk dynasty is Turkmen in origin. As he wrote: “Thanks to the political significance of the Seljuk dynasty, we have more detailed information about the people from which it emerged – the Turkmens – than about all other Turkic peoples in the Middle Ages.” According to historians Z. V. Togan and Douglas Dunlop ( Douglas Morton Dunlop ), it is claimed that the Seljuk group originated from the Khazar Turks.
During the period under consideration, the military strategy of the Khazars was refocused not so much on the conquest of new territories as on forcing the enemy to abandon aggression. This foreshadowed the orientation of the main vector of foreign Khazaria’s policy of developing international transit trade and weakening the borders for large trade corridors. Such a policy to a certain extent served as a catalyst for the beginning of a new wave of the Great Migration of Peoples in the 9th century, and new Asian nomads began to cross the Volga. The first people to arrive on the western bank of the Volga were the Hungarians, who occupied the Northern Black Sea region. For their part, the Khazars did not force out the “migrants”, but agreed that the Hungarians recognized their suzerainty.
The predominance of the transit and trade component in the foreign policy strategy and diplomacy of Khazaria led to its further strengthening through economic expansion. As a result, the influence of the Khazars in the region was so significant that in a number of eastern languages the former Hellenistic name “Caspian Sea” received the name “Khazar”. The historical period of the power of the Khazar state, which competed with the Arab Caliphate, is designated by the civilizational space called the “Khazar world”. The end of the 9th century is considered the end of the “Khazar world” – an era of relative stability in the steppe. [Khazar is also spelled as Hazar]
We can trace the logic of the formation of the Great Seljuks, when their founding fathers, during the collapse of the Khazar state, were forced to wander, avoiding wars and the danger of being destroyed. In terms of neutrality, one of the priority principles for the Seljuks was not to enter into a military conflict and to fully use negotiation methods for preventive purposes. Seljuk diplomacy was initially built on the paradigm of achieving mutual understanding with the opposing side, explaining and verifying strategic goals and reaching an agreement. This was manifested in the relations of the first Seljuks with the rulers of the Oguz state of Yabgu , Karakhanids , Ghaznavids , and the Baghdad Caliphate. Ultimative letters to the enemy meant, as it were, reference points of “red lines”, the intersection of which meant a step towards a direct military clash. The victorious rise of the Seljuks to imperial heights at the beginning of the second millennium AD was mostly due to the forced response to the aggression of the then Eastern powers, who sought to subjugate this nomadic people and use their victorious troops in the feudal wars of the Asian world. The victorious battle of the Seljuks with the Ghaznavids at Dandanakan in 1040 became the then implementation of the forced entry into war according to the principle of “strike first if you are cornered and a fight is inevitable.” As is known, from this historical moment the triumphal march of the Seljuks towards their future empire began.
Contrary to the widespread opinion about the religious and civilizational hostility of the Turkmen tribes to the Byzantines, it is necessary to make some clarification in favor of the fact that there were more periods of relative stability between them than cases of major military clashes. Without denying the armed conflicts that occurred, it is necessary to pay tribute to the fact that the Turkmen adopted many useful things from the political, trade, economic, scientific and educational traditions of Byzantium. And the Tekfurs, that is, the rulers of the border fortress cities, in turn, learned more closely about the life rules and customs of their southern neighbors. It can be stated that the peculiar “creeping expansion of nomads” in the spaces of Anatolia took place in relatively peaceful conditions, and the Byzantine rulers did not offer much resistance.
The Seljuks’ generosity towards the Byzantines is evidenced by the historical narrative of Alp Arslan’s noble attitude towards the captured Emperor Romanos Diogenes IV at the Battle of Malazgirt in 1071. This epochal clash, as is known, was initiated by the Byzantine emperor-commander himself, when Alp Arslan was far to the west – within the boundaries of northern Mesopotamia. As the French historian Pierre Vuillemard asserts in his book “The Crusades” (Pierre Willemart . Les Croisades), Roman Diogenes IV led his army of more than one hundred thousand, determined to destroy the small, as it seemed to him, army of the Seljuks of several tens of thousands of people. Although Alp Arslan “proved his extraordinary leniency, limiting himself to tribute, several corrections of the border and a formal promise of submission on the part of the Byzantines,” writes Viimar, “the Eastern Christian Empire never recovered from the defeat at Manzikert.” It is possible that the campaign of Diogenes IV was specially provoked by his deeper and larger opponents than those who were caught by surprise by the then ýörük, that is, organized migrants in the modern sense, as if they had flooded the Byzantine lands in Asia Minor. Alp Arslan knew this very well from reliable sources in Byzantium itself, and therefore showed his noble attitude towards the defeated Diogenes.
As S. Agadzhanov notes in his monograph devoted to the Seljuk state in the 11th-12th centuries: “The ten-year reign of Sultan Alp Arslan (1063-1072) is marked by the further revival and development of agriculture, crafts and urban life. To a large extent, this was facilitated by the revival of trade and exchange on the routes connecting Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan with the Far East, India and Asia Minor. New colonies of foreign merchants, in particular Indians and Byzantines, appeared in the large cities lying on these highways.”
By the way, it is necessary to add that the implacable enemy of Byzantium was in fact located in the west of the empire, rather than threatening from the south or the east. In this context, the crusades to the East known in history began long before their generally accepted date and much earlier than even the Battle of Malazgirt. Here it should be noted that, although the Seljuks are characterized as invaders of the then formally Byzantine lands, the real aggressors were precisely the western opponents of Constantinople, the Normans and the Celts. According to Viimar , for the papal church, too, “bringing the Greeks to their senses was almost a godly deed…”.
“De facto” neutrality of the first Seljuks and their descendants in relation to European affairs consisted in the fact that they did not officially interfere in internal Christian strife. Tensions in the Christian world became especially acute after the demarche of the Patriarch of Constantinople Michael Cerularius, under whose leadership on July 20, 1054, 12 metropolitans and several archbishops signed a conciliar definition of the synod on the curse of papal legates and the illegality of their actions, headed by Cardinal Humbert. This event was preceded by the fact that the high representative of the Roman Church, who arrived in Constantinople at that time, treated both the Eastern hierarchs, in particular Patriarch Michael Cerularius, and the emperor himself with extreme arrogance. The “crown” of the papal ambassadors’ stay was the laying of a letter of excommunication on the Eastern church hierarchy on the altar of the Church of St. Sophia. This act was qualified by the Byzantines as a gross violation of church and political ethics. This event served as a point of no return in relations between the Western and Eastern churches.
In response, the Holy See sought to do everything possible to return to the unity of the Churches, and the means to achieve this goal were as numerous as they were varied. Among other things, for the necessary case, the Pope of Rome had on his table the option of subjugating the Byzantine Empire and the Orthodox Church by more radical methods. This was later manifested in the strategy of the Crusades, when Constantinople was repeatedly subjected to devastation.
Ten years after the above-mentioned break, in 1081, with the support of the Pope, the Normans attacked Constantinople, who were opposed by Emperor Alexius Comnenus. In his book, Viimar draws attention to the interesting fact that: “after several years of stubborn resistance, Comnenus managed to repel the Norman attack… thanks to the Turkish troops” sent from Nicaea. These were mercenary troops of the Turkish tribes, who, being warriors by nature, were in the service of both the Byzantine and Roman and other European rulers.
Pope Gregory VII sent a number of letters to European rulers exhorting them to help the “dying Byzantine Empire” because of the schism of the Orthodox from the Universal Church. The famous historian A. A. Vasiliev in his two-volume monograph “History of the Byzantine Empire” notes: “As you can see, these letters are not only about a crusade to liberate the Holy Land. Gregory VII drew up a plan for an expedition to Constantinople to save Byzantium, this main defender of Christianity in the East.” A. A. Vasiliev suggested that “in Gregory VII’s plans, the holy war against Islam was in second place, and that the Pope, arming Western Christianity for the fight against the Muslim East, had in mind the “schismatic” East. The latter was more terrible for Gregory VII than Islam.”
That Islamic-Orthodox relations were generally much milder than the level of radicalism in relations between Catholics and Orthodox Christians is evidenced by the comments of W. Ramsay (Palace churches of the Anatolian Seljuks: tolerance or necessity?). In particular, he wrote about the Seljuk policy towards Christians: “The Seljuk sultans governed their Christian subjects in a very mild and tolerant manner, and even the Byzantine historians, who were prejudiced against them, allowed themselves only a few hints about the Christians, who in many cases preferred the power of the sultans to the power of the emperors… Christians under the rule of the Seljuks were happier than in the heart of the Byzantine Empire. The most unfortunate of all were the Byzantine borderlands, which were subjected to constant attacks. As for religious persecution, there is not a single trace of it in the Seljuk period.”
Nevertheless, describing the whole twist and turn of events in the Mediterranean and Eastern world of politics at that time, Villemar continues that the Emperor “Alexius Comnenus fights against the Normans with the help of the Turks from Nicaea, who took all of Anatolia from him. The Norman Guiscard with Muslim troops hurries to defend the Pope, besieged by the Germans. What can we say about the fact that some Muslim from the “Norman” troops prayed and performed namaz right in the Basilica of St. Peter… destroyed, plundered and burned by the defenders of the Pope!”
At the same time, the annexation of Jerusalem and the main part of Palestine under the rule of the Seljuk Sultan Melik Shah in 1078 became a subject of praise from Eastern Christians. In particular, the prominent monk Matthew of Edessa, an Armenian by nationality, wrote: “Melik Shah showed his kindness, mercy and benevolence to believers in Christ.”
Almost 125 years later, with the beginning of the declared Fourth Crusade, the Crusaders, instead of conquering Egypt, attacked the Byzantine Empire on April 13, 1204 and captured Constantinople, completely plundering the city. As a participant in the events, the Picard knight Robert de Clari, wrote , in Constantinople “there was such an abundance of wealth, so much gold and silver plate, so many precious stones, that it truly seemed a miracle how such magnificent wealth was brought here. Participant and chronicler of the campaign, the noble French baron Geoffroy de Villehardouin, reports: “Such abundant booty has not been taken from any city since the creation of the world.” The description alone of the sacred objects and remains stolen from Constantinople, compiled in the 1870s, barely fit into two voluminous volumes.
The history of the relationship between the Seljuks and the Byzantines, starting from the first moments of the appearance of the Turkmen tribes in Anatolia up to the transformation of Constantinople into the capital of the Ottoman state – Istanbul can become the subject of research within the framework of the theory of civilizational transformations of continental or subcontinental scale. Looking ahead a little, here we can make a remark that the preservation and new elevation of Orthodox Christianity to imperial status later occurred due to the creation and strengthening of the “post-Mongol” Russian state, which declared itself the successor of Byzantium.
Having consolidated their position in Asia Minor and settled in their relatively urbanized settlements, the former nomads adopted and to a large extent improved some principles of Byzantine governance over subordinate territories, in particular, by creating an effective state apparatus and the corresponding bureaucracy. In addition, already during the period of creating their own statehood, the Seljuks and Ottomans managed to deflect the symbolic sword of Damocles of the nomadic system. Its essence was that the steppe states, even empires, disappeared from the political map of the world soon or after a short historical period after the death of the founding leader. The threat to the stability of the state system of this type was the institutions of traditional tribal democracy and the attachment of the nomads to cattle breeding as the basis of an extensive economy with a low surplus product.
“This is the source of the ephemerality of all steppe empires, which were based solely on the military charisma of their leaders and fell apart at the first setback,” writes K. Panchenko in his article in the collection “The Phenomenon of the Ottoman Empire,” published as a special issue of the journal “Historical Bulletin.” Regarding the stability of the Seljuks and Ottomans, Panchenko further notes: “By conquering areas of urban and agricultural culture, the nomads gained control of a much larger resource base, but faced the problem of managing an unfamiliar economic and administrative mechanism. They inevitably turned to the services of a hereditary urban bureaucracy from the conquered population, the most striking example of which is Nizam al- Mulk (1018/20–1092), the vizier of the Seljuks and the father of Middle Eastern political science.”
In turn, speaking about the volatility of ideas of statehood among nomads, Arminius Vambery wrote in his notes “Journey through Central Asia”: “During my stay among the Turkmens, I was most struck by the fact that I did not find anyone who wanted to command, and not a single person who wanted to obey… despite the apparent anarchy and savagery, they have – until they declare hostility publicly – less robbery and murder, less injustice and immorality than other Asian peoples whose social conditions are based on Islamic civilization.” Analyzing the mechanisms that form the general ethnic rules for regulating public life, Vambery emphasizes the special significance of the original traditions of the Turkmens, expressing them with the general term “däp,” which is also translated as “tradition,” “custom,” or “foundations.” Vambery notes that “the inhabitants of the desert are governed by their ancient and powerful ruler, invisible but clearly manifested in the word “däp”… The Turkmens strictly observe everything that the däp prescribes and abhor everything that it forbids.” In this regard, with a hint at the roots of the formation of the platform of stability of the Ottoman Empire over several centuries, Vambery notes that: “ deep down, the nomad is still the same as he was 2000 years ago, and his character can change only when he replaces his light yurt with a solid house built with hard work, i.e. when he ceases to be a nomad.” Thus, the defeated Constantinople may have found its reincarnation in Istanbul, transforming itself into the capital of the real East – in the civilizational sense, in contrast to the former – geographical, Eastern Rome.
An interesting fact in the history of the Ottoman -Byzantine “binary” may be that almost a century before the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turkmens in the 30-60s of the 14th century completely conquered the territories of the former Bithynia, and then the Nicaean Empire, which since 1261 was considered part of Byzantium. The territory of Bithynia-Nicaea In the 7th, 8th, 12th and 13th centuries, it was one of the main centers of migration of Slavic peoples to Asia Minor. The former Slavic military colonies in Bithynia subsequently became one of the powerful supports and sources of prosperity for the Byzantine Empire. It is possible that their descendants may have played a significant role in the process of confessional and ideological formation of the Russian succession of Byzantine foundations and traditions after the fall of Constantinople. At the same time, major Ottoman politicians and military leaders arose from their ranks.
Although the history of relations between the Ottoman and Russian empires is associated with a whole series of wars and conflicts, regarding existential strategies for delimiting spheres of geopolitical interests, a kind of mutual understanding on the verge of maintaining mutual neutrality is observed. This is evidenced by the Ottoman archives of the 19th century, where one can find many appeals from local Central Asian rulers, a number of Afghan and Iranian tribal leaders with a request to accept the Sultan, who had the status of Caliph, into citizenship. Almost all such petitions were rejected in the most gentle form and with kind words from the Grand Vizier. As a result, high-ranking representatives of the petitioners returned back with gold and gifts on behalf of the Sultan-Caliph. The famous Arminius also reported to London about very trusting contacts between Istanbul and St. Petersburg on these issues. Vambery also described in a number of studies as a paid agent of the English.
The monograph by A.D. Vasiliev describes the diplomatic relations of the Ottoman Empire with Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, where it is clearly shown that their attempts to secure material and military support from the Ottomans ended in vain. The researcher describes the history of relations between the Central Asian states and the Porte in the context of important political events that took place in the world. In his opinion, the Ottoman state was unable to satisfy the demands of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva for military assistance, since it did not want to aggravate relations with Russia and did not see any benefit from such support either for itself or for the khanates of Central Asia.
Vasiliev in his doctoral research analyzes the visits of the envoys of the Emir of Bukhara and other rulers to Istanbul. In particular, the materials of the Ottoman archive of the Prime Minister’s Office indicate that at the beginning of the 19th century, contacts between the Bukhara Khanate and the Ottoman Empire began to intensify. Thus, the Emir of Bukhara Haidar (1800-1826) almost immediately after ascending the throne hastened to establish diplomatic contacts with the Ottoman Empire. Apparently, already in 1801, his envoy with the rank of “buyukelchi”, i.e. “great ambassador”, Mirza Haji Sabyr arrived in Istanbul. In a letter to the Sultan, Emir Haidar called himself “the ruler of Turan”, thus emphasizing his claims to power over the entire territory of Central Asia. He reported on his accession to the throne, his loyalty to the Sultan and the fact that he was extending it to all of Turan.
The Bukharan envoy, who arrived in Istanbul in April 1803, asked on behalf of Emir Haidar that the Sultan recognize his status as “Padishah of the lands of Turan and Turkestan.” The Porte decided to refuse his request for fear of possible diplomatic and political complications with Russia. Another embassy from the Bukharan Emir arrived in Istanbul at the end of 1815, headed by Mehmed Sherif Bey. This time, among his political requests, Emir Haidar listed the regions of Central Asia that he considered to be his own: Maverannahr, Fergana, Dasht-i Kipchak, Khorezm, Merv, Kulyab, Balkh and Badakhshan “along with all the surrounding areas.” Considering that the Emir considered himself a loyal servant of the Sultan, he asked the Ottoman Sultan for a firman that would prove that the two above-mentioned regions were the Emir of Bukharan’s.
Such requests and appeals to the Ottoman Sultan from the rulers of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva continued to arrive for a long time, prevailing far in the first half of the 19th century. In most cases, they all received a negative response along with an expression of full moral support from the Ottoman side and a wish for peaceful coexistence with Muslim neighbors. It can be said that the Ottomans did not undertake any open demarche or other serious political and diplomatic action against Russia on Central Asian issues, even as allies of the British in their “Great Game” against the Russians. Nevertheless, the external neutrality of the Ottomans was undoubtedly accompanied, as far as possible, by covert, not always successful activities of Ottoman agents in the territories of Russian influence.
According to the research of F. Razakov, the future Governor-General of Turkestan Alexey Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, forty years after his appointment to this post, that is, in 1876, visited Eastern Turkestan in the rank of staff captain, at the head of the imperial embassy. Then he held negotiations with the ruler of the Yettishar (Dzhetishaar, Semirechye) emirate, Magomet Yakub-bek Badaulet. There Kuropatkin witnessed the activities of Ottoman military instructors in Yettishar, who took direct part in the modernization of small arms and artillery guns. Nevertheless, he came to the conclusion that the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the region was nominal.
The eminent historian N. Khalfin in his work entitled “Sultan’s Turkey and English expansion in Central Asia (50-80s of the 19th century)” comes to the conclusion that “the activity of Turkish emissaries in Central Asia and the propaganda of the ideas of Muslim solidarity was a cover for the activities of English agents… and did not bring the expected results. England and Turkey were able to attract to their side only the clergy and feudal nobility, but they did not find wide support among the peoples of Turkestan.”
Thus, the relative slowness or passivity of the Ottoman Empire during the Great Game in Central and South Asia sometimes resembled a form of undeclared but de facto neutrality towards the British-Russian rivalry. This situation can be partly explained by the predominant focus of the Porte’s geopolitical strategy on the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. As is well known, it was in these territories that the fierce Ottoman -Russian battles were fought in their time.
The new Turkey and Bolshevik Russia, revived on the ashes of the First World War, found mutual understanding among themselves by the end of the second decade of the 20th century in order to withstand the Western onslaught. History shows that the commonality of their goals was reflected not only in the red color of the Soviet and Turkish flags, but was confirmed by specific actions to save the young post-imperial republics from inevitable destruction under the blows of an aggressive coalition.
One example is the fact that in 1920–1922 the Bolsheviks sided with the Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was fighting against Greek, British, French, Armenian and Italian troops. Moscow sent one of its most capable generals, Mikhail Frunze, to help Ankara, and at the same time the Turks entrusted the Soviet specialists with a military secret: a plan for an upcoming offensive against the Greeks. Based on archival materials, Igor Gashkov writes in his article for TASS that in July 1920, Deputy Foreign Minister Bekir Sami Bey brought a draft seven-point Memorandum to Moscow for negotiations. Point 2 of this document stated: “Turkey strives to live completely independently in its internal and external affairs within its national borders. And provided that this condition is met, to ensure a common future and a common destiny with Russia.”
Here we can hypothetically hint at the above-mentioned history of the settlement of Bithynia by the Slavs, which could serve as a kind of justification for briefing Ataturk on the historical community of the Turks and Slavs, which his diplomats were then unable to comprehend during the negotiations in Moscow. As Igor Gashkov writes: “The formulation about the unity of historical destinies confused the Turkish negotiators. According to the memoirs of one of them, Kazim Karabekir, the diplomats discussed in their circle what content it should be filled with. They agreed that Soviet Russia and the Turks would exchange what they could give each other: Moscow would provide Ankara with money and weapons, and the latter would influence Russian Muslims in the spirit of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks and would act against Armenia, where communist power had not yet been established.”
It is possible that one of the consequences of such allied mutual support was that the legendary Enver Pasha, first an ally and then a competitor of Mustafa Kemal – Ataturk, was liquidated by the Bolsheviks in order to prevent him from returning to Istanbul to fight for power. It is possible that this event was one of the steps that prevented the potential escalation of civil war in the new Turkey. The subsequent official non-intervention of the Turkish Republic in the Central Asian events of the 1920-30s resembles the continuation of the cautious and pragmatic neutrality of the former Ottoman Empire in relation to the strategy of the aforementioned “Great Game” during the Victorian era of the West.
As the dangers were overcome, a grateful Ataturk noted in a letter to Lenin: “…in the general context of a history filled with the noise of bloody wars that have been fought for centuries between the Turks and Russians, such a rapid reconciliation between us has astonished other nations. Turkey is much closer to Russia, especially to the Russia of recent months, than to Western Europe. … Turkey will not retreat from its course in relation to Soviet Russia, and all rumors to the contrary are groundless. I assure you that we will never sign an agreement or enter into an alliance directly or indirectly directed against Soviet Russia.”
In the center of Istanbul stands the “Republic” monument to the great Ataturk – the founder and first president of the Turkish Republic Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The explanatory plaque to the monument, made in the form of an open book, includes the names of people who were in one way or another involved in the formation of the Turkish Republic. It is quite symbolic that among them are the names of Kliment Voroshilov and Mikhail Frunze, who are depicted standing behind Ataturk.
It should be noted that for more than a hundred years after these events, Türkiye remains committed to Ataturk’s strategic legacy, and this contributes to maintaining stability in large parts of Asia.
Thus, using only a small set of historical facts as an example, one can trace the key significance of neutrality, which, in addition to its international legal aspects, also has a whole range of political and diplomatic instruments for practical purposes.
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Over the past two centuries, international relations have experienced various forms of neutrality, including the aforementioned phenomenon of the American Monroe Doctrine, as well as the practice of the Non-Aligned Movement, the creation of which was largely facilitated by the teachings of the great humanist Mahatma Gandhi.
At the same time, over the last decade, interest in stable forms of neutrality has noticeably grown in the world, especially when by the end of the first quarter of the new century the stability of this institution was somewhat shaken in a number of regions of Europe and Asia. Against this background, the relatively new, and perhaps the highest level of permanent neutrality achieved today, is becoming increasingly attractive, as in the case of Turkmenistan, in support of which two special resolutions of the UN General Assembly were adopted.
On September 27, 2024, the delegation of Turkmenistan spoke at the regular 79th session of the UN General Assembly, where our country’s positions on current global issues were outlined, in particular, those related to ensuring security, sustainable development, as well as climate change and the humanitarian aspect. In this context, international initiatives of President Serdar Berdimuhamedov in these areas were voiced.
In particular, in order to implement the Global Security Strategy in the long term, proposals have been put forward to use the mechanisms of preventive diplomacy and the potential of neutrality to strengthen international peace and resolve various emerging situations. Turkmenistan also puts forward an initiative to grant neutral countries the status of priority partnership with the UN in the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations.
Turkmenistan has now launched active preparations for holding the upcoming International Year of Peace and Trust in 2025 at a high level. As part of the planned program events, emphasis will be placed on such important topics as the policy of neutrality, strengthening peace, security, dialogue and ecology.
The Chairman of the Maslakhaty of Turkmenistan Hero Arkadag, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, especially emphasized in his speech at the session of the Halk Maslahaty of Turkmenistan: “In the International Year of Peace and Trust, also marked by the 30th anniversary of the permanent neutrality of our independent state, the global task is to strengthen cooperation and mutual understanding on the planet. Neutrality is a doctrine that illuminates our undertakings at the global level, calling peoples to peace and cooperation, friendship and brotherhood, unity, promoting humanism. This doctrine gives energy to our people to achieve new frontiers, creating and building in the name of the great future of our native Fatherland.” /// nCa, 8 October 2024
Dr. Begench Karaev deals with the problems of philosophy of law and politics. He is the author of a number of textbooks and monographs, including “Political analysis and strategic planning”, “Political analysis: problems of theory and methodology: (Experience in the study of modern Central Asian society)” and “Traditional and modern in the political life of Central Asian society (experience of political analysis)”.