Najib Manalai
A few weeks ago the NATO defense ministers held discussions in Brussels to provide a “readable” picture of Afghanistan’s security situation after 2014. Accounts from this meeting did not bring much light on how the future of Afghanistan is seen by its international partners. Afghan national security forces could be kept, human resources wise, at the level Afghan government proposed sometimes back. Between 8000 and 12000 (but it can also be 5000 as well as 15000) NATO own forces can stay to, it is said, train the Afghan military. This, if it comes in addition to the needed manning of the US forces which are supposed to station in Afghanistan after the expected security agreement is concluded, could be seen as a new development.
NATO is ready to maintain Afghan security forces numbers at around 350,000 troops which is much more than the figures cast before the Chicago conference (May 2012).. In Chicago an agreement was achieved to bring this number back to 228,500. Which economic, policy, social and strategic analysis led to set the Afghan security forces staff number at less than 100,000 in the beginning of the After-Taliban era, to over 350,000 in 2010, to 228,000 in 2012 and again to 350,000 in February 2013. Which changes are still to come out and why? Nobody in the public knows the rationales behind these variations. One can easily bet a dollar that even the Afghan National Security Forces senior staff do not know it either!
If we sum up all the reasons for which the Afghan war lasted for more than one decade and is set to last for many more years, the most outstanding reason is the contempt in which Afghan policy makers and International Community held the ground realities in this country. From the very beginning, when US politicians and strategists sought a way to minimize their military losses through subcontracting the Anti-Taliban war to warlords who had demonstrated their inability to handle the situation, to the times when the security load was handed over to ineffective, voracious mainly American owned private security companies, to the unacceptable intermingling in the election process and to the decision of leaving the battlefield as if nothing else mattered, it seems that Afghanistan’s realities, Afghan people’s aspirations and the final outcome of the operation was the last thing to worry about. Whatever the decision that will be adopted in Brussels in the upcoming hours, once again the forgotten factor is Afghanistan.
How much security forces are needed for Afghanistan? To answer this question we have first to answer another question: What for Afghanistan needs security forces? Most of Afghan Generals and Military strategy makers I have met during the last few years, still have a strategic vision based on Cold War doctrines. Military experts, who express their views in Afghan media outlets, present a military model for Afghanistan that focuses on numbers, rather than effectiveness. Many times, when listening to these experts, the image of the Afghan National Security Forces would seem much similar to that of WW1 armies!
Let’s address the main questions from a political analysis viewpoint:
1 – Why does Afghanistan need security forces?
a- Border Protection
Afghanistan has more than 5000 kilometers long border with six neighbors. No direct military threat is perceived, nor even envisioned for upcoming decades from China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The two neighbors who can be a potential threat for Afghanistan’s territorial integrity are Iran and Pakistan. Both of them have huge armies, up-to-date technologies, potential or effective nuclear force and manifold higher revenue than what Afghanistan could even not dream of. Whatever the strength of an Afghan Army could be, it cannot stand a direct military confrontation with none of these two neighbors. If, God forbid, Afghanistan enters in war with one of these two countries, the only option for Afghanistan will be a non-conventional resistance for which heavy warfare is of no use. A several hundred thousands strong National Security Force is a far lesser deterrence mean than a small, light, mobile, will trained national commando force.
Afghanistan can only benefit from an effective external security, if it can rely on international guarantees, which are often in contradiction with a strong national military setup.
The best way for Afghanistan to guarantee its present territory (and even any potential recovery of lost lands) is to strengthen its geo-economic situation as a resources corridor.
As for the border protection against trafficking and smuggling activities, the task is better handled by appropriate police force than a National Army section.
b- Law enforcement
The law enforcement, and effective implementation of a real judiciary system requires a highly qualified police force which is deeply committed to citizen’s rights and to human rights.
c- Insurgency threats
Insurgency is likely to constitute the main threat for Afghan National Security during the upcoming years. As far as the Afghan government ensures an effective grip on country’s public affairs, building needed institutions and establishing a real confidence climate within the country, real risks exist that some local (or even external) interests will lead to insurgency. Fighting against insurgency does not require huge military means but strong anti-guerrilla skills which cannot be developed under the shape of a large army.
d- Anti-criminality
To address the criminality the issue shall be seen from two complementary viewpoints: the Civilian peace keeping activity which includes criminal investigation police force and proximity security forces, and the fight against Large Criminality. These two activities should be considered, each in its own context, not as a whole.
2 – What can Afghanistan afford?
Afghanistan domestic revenue in 2013 is estimated to amount USD 2.4 bn. Afghanistan governments ordinary budget is almost USD 4 bn and development budget is set at a little more than USD 3 bn. Hopefully, the domestic revenue can reach USD 8 bn in about 5 years time while Afghanistan development needs will grow accordingly. In Chicago, Afghanistan’s annual needs for security purpose was estimated to more than USD 4.1 bn, of which Afghanistan has accepted to finance USD 500 mn. In the upcoming years Afghanistan is expected to increase its own share. The new hypothesis will raise the funding needs to US$ 6.5 bn.
If International Community stands by its commitments, which is far from granted; and supposing that Afghanistan accepts to dedicate at least 10% of its GDP (one of the highest in the world, military expenditure/GDS ratio of Israel is under 7%, India spends 2.7%, Pakistan 2.8%, Iran 1.8% ); with the hypothesis that Afghanistan’s military expenditure remains constant in nominal value for several years, this country will need a GDP of USD 40 bn to fund its security forces autonomously. The economic growth perspective of Afghanistan (around 5% per year) let us imagine that it will take about 20 years before Afghanistan gets, security wise, self reliant.
In Chicago, Afghanistan has succeeded to convince the international community to consider separately security issues and development issues of Afghanistan for the transition period and the transformation decade. But international commitments are never carved in stone and Afghans, learning from their history, shall know that no future can be built on such basis. The $4.1 bn funding, that has been agreed on in 2010 (or the new hypothesis of $ 6.5 bn) does, for the least, not reflect a sustainable solution.
Besides, according to NATO estimates (an annual cost of USD 6.5 bn for 352.000 soldiers) the average cost of an Afghan soldier will reach nearly USD 18.000. Within this cost range, the Afghan soldiers will hardly benefit from standard quality training and acceptable living standards. Such an army will not prove much effective in conducting a non conventional war.
In a realistic approach, with 10% of its GDP dedicated to military expenditure, the highest amount Afghanistan can dedicate to its security cannot exceed USD 2 bn per year.
3 – How strong the Afghan National Security Forces should be?
In the light of the security needs and economic perspective presented above, the Afghan National Security Forces should be organized in precisely identified corpses, each having its own technical and human resources requirements. Based on an estimate of 40 Millions Afghan population, the poor transportation facilities of the country, the education level of the Afghans as expected for the upcoming 20 years and on the numbers of security forces in countries in a similar economic set up as Afghanistan and taking in consideration the present volatile security situation the following table (based on rough estimates from internet sources) may be a ‘realistic’ basis for discussion:
Force
|
Force |
Duties |
Nr. |
salary per capita (k$/y) |
Other exp. per capita (k$/y) |
Total cost (M$) |
| Afghan National Army | Comabattant Commando Force |
15000 |
12 |
18 |
450 |
| Commando Logistics |
30000 |
10 |
15 |
750 |
|
| Airforce |
5000 |
12 |
25 |
200 |
|
| Afghan National Police | Anti-criminality Police Force |
10000 |
12 |
18 |
300 |
| Quick Action Police Force |
5000 |
12 |
18 |
150 |
|
| Criminal investigation police |
2000 |
8 |
10 |
40 |
|
| Peace Kipping Municipal/Local Police Force |
200000 |
4 |
2 |
1200 |
|
| National Department for Security | High level Intelligence Officers |
500 |
12 |
10 |
110 |
| Intelligence Collectors |
3000 |
6 |
4 |
30 |
This table sets the total number of Afghan security forces at about 260000 personnel and an annual cost of USD 3 bn. Given the present level of the international commitment, Afghanistan can build in less than 5 years a properly equipped, trained and accommodated security force that is able to address real challenges. As foreseen in Tokyo documents, Afghanistan will reach a GDP of USD 30 bn by 2018/2019. Thus, it can envisage independent security means without taking chances with its prosperity and its independence.
4 – The training issue
NATO plans to leave between 8000 and 12000 people to train Afghan Security Forces. Since Afghanistan armed forces, police forces and intelligence are not expected to have sophisticated warfare, the training needs should be accordingly designed. If the NATO trainers are given the mission to teach Afghan soldiers and police forces how to operate simple, light weaponry, these numbers are overwhelmingly exaggerated. Besides, given the average cost of European or American soldiers sent to Afghanistan (at least $ 500,000 per year, per person) the training cost of the Afghan security forces will roughly amount to the actual cost of these very forces. Besides, when trainers are non-Afghan personnel, at least the same number of interpreter will be needed.
Concentrating a less than one year effort on training several thousand Afghan trainers will ensure lasting training skills for Afghan armed forces, whatever their number could be. Moreover, Afghanistan has many thousands of highly skilled, experienced and talented officers with expertise in both, guerilla activity and anti-guerilla combat. These officers, already available for quality training would surpass any foreign instructors if they are given a refreshed knowledge of new technologies and war tactics.
Again, it is not realistic to think of a standard training for all armed forces: the commando forces would need a high level special force training while local police will need only simple police courses along with general education about human rights and citizen’s rights.
The Local Police and low qualification military personnel, which in the long term is destined to be dismantled, will also need a professionalizing training in fields that will be most needed in a post war Afghanistan. Such an approach will also help the integration of these people in the normal civilian life when security task will be handed over to a regular police force
***
2013 is the last time slot for Afghanistan and for the International Community to carve out a realistic, economically affordable, socially acceptable and financially sustainable set up to ensure that the withdrawal of international forces does not lead to a new chaos in this region. One can agree with Mr. Obama that the “War Against International Terrorism” is over. It was over well before now. At least the center of gravity of the terrorism does no more reside in Afghanistan (even not in the region), but regional stability requires peace and mutual understanding between the countries involved in this war. A reliable Afghan security force is one of the most important components of such understanding.
Nato and Afghanistan shall not waste the last opportunity, at the end of a useless, tiring war, to stop building on moving sands. Considering ground realities is the only way to ensure a lasting solution for this conflict.
About the author: Najib Manalai, 54, is an Afghan poet, writer and political analyst. He has authored several books on Afghan literature. Educated in France, he publishes literary works and political analysis in various Afghan Media outlets, and writes regular columns for BBC Pashto website. He works as a senior advisor at the Afghan Ministry of Finance. He also has served as senior advisor to the Minister of Information and culture and as deputy minister for culture.
He can be reached at najib.manalai@gmail.com